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ABSTRACT. Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just 
if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to 
be measured by an 'index' of 'primary social goods'. It is this index that gives content 
to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this 
essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls 
says, but that makes use of no index. Instead of invoking an index of primary social 
goods, the principle formulated here invokes a partial ordering of prospects for 
opportunities. 
i .  PRIMARY SOCIAL GOODS AND THE I N D E X I N G  PROBLEM 
In A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls claims as one of the virtues of his theory 
that it does not require interpersonal comparisons of utility. Instead, the 
interpersonal comparisons needed for the theory are based on an ' index 
of primary social goods'. Primary goods are goods useful toward widely 
disparate ends, "things which it is supposed a rational man wants what- 
ever else he wants" (p. 92). 1 The primary social goods include rights and 
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth (pp. 62, 92). In Rawls' 
theory, then, the basis of interpersonal comparisons is overt: the compari- 
sons are to be made on the basis of who gets how much of what. 
Why might this be an advantage? To anyone who denies that interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are meaningful, the advantage will seem obvious: 
by not  invoking such comparisons, the theory avoids a pseudo-concept. 
Even if such comparisons are meaningful, though, they should perhaps still 
be avoided in the formulation of a public conception of justice - a concep- 
t ion which is to be used in resolving conflicts of interest over the basic 
structure of society. For even if such comparisons can be made in principle, 
they will often be delicate, and the relevant psychological evidence will 
probably not be compelling. When interests conflict, and delicately based 
judgments are to be used to adjudicate them, each person's judgments are 
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likely to reflect his own interests. When that happens, there will be no agree- 
ment on how the standards of adjudication apply to the conflict in question. 
A public conception of justice should set up standards that are easy to apply, 
and interpersonal comparisons of utility, even if meaningful, do not pass this 
test (cf. pp. 90--93). 
How clear, then, is Rawls' own standard? He speaks of an 'index' of 
primary social goods, which is to provide a clear standard for interpersonal 
comparison; my question concerns how that index is to be specified. 2 For it 
is this index that gives content to Rawls' difference principle: that the index 
of primary goods for the worst-off representative man is to be as high as is 
feasible (pp. 83, 90-95). 
It might be thought that the specific index used. does not greatly matter 
for the content of the difference principle. The index is used to identify the .  
worst-off representative man, and those who are worst off in one primary 
good are likely to be worst off in all. In that case, all indices will agree on 
who is worst off, however differently they weigh the various primary goods. 3 
The index is used, though, not only to identify the worst-off representa- 
tive man, but to compare various alternative arrangements of society from his 
standpoint: that social arrangement is just which accords the highest feasible 
index to the worst-off representative man. Now alternative social arrange- 
ments may differ vastly in the kinds of rewards they offer: capitalism with an 
income floor, for instance, might offer the worst-offrepresentative man con- 
siderable income with few powers, whereas some alternative might offer him 
a lower income with more powers. How the index weighs income against 
powers will determine which social arrangement accords the worst-off rep- 
resentative man the higher index of primary social goods. 
Some of the things Rawls says suggest that the index is not to be part of 
the difference principle itself, which is that "social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they a r e . . ,  to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged" (p. 83). True~ to explicate the phrase 'to the greatest benefit 
of  the least advantaged', we need an index, since the phrase means 'such that 
the least expected index of primary social goods in the society is as great as is 
feasible'. Rawls suggests, though, that whereas the difference principle is to 
be adopted in the original position, which is the first stage of a four-stage 
sequence of deliberation, the index that explicates it is to be left to a third, 
'legislative' stage (1974, p. 642). In the legislative stage, as in the original 
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position, no one knows his own identity, abilities, and plan of life; but in the 
legislative stage, unlike the original position, "the full range of general 
economic and social facts" about the particular society in question can be 
brought to bear (p 199). The difference principle, then, is adopted by parties 
ignorant of  the particular circumstances of their own society, but the index 
that interprets it is to be constructed after the parties have learned what 
their particular society is like. At that point, the index is to be constructed 
"by taking up the standpoint of the representative individual" from the 
worst-off group, 
and asking which combination of primary social goods it would be rational for him to 
prefer, In doing this, we admittedly rely on our intuitive capacities. This cannot be 
avoided entirely, however, The aim is to replace moral judgments by those of rational 
prudence and to make the appeal to intuition more limited in scope, more sharply 
focused (p. 94). 
More, though, needs to be said. The difference principle is of indetermin- 
ate meaning until we know how, given the circumstances of any particular 
society, to construct the index through which the principle applies to that 
society. The construction cannot come directly from judgments of  rational 
prudence, since what matters is the rational preferences of 'the representa- 
tive individual' of  the worst-off group, and 'the representative individual' 
is not a person. Rather, statements about 'the representative individual' 
abbreviate more complex statements about a class of individuals. What is 
rationally prudent for the representative worst-off individual must in some 
way be a matter of what is rationally prudent for genuine individuals, or of 
what would be, under certain circumstances. 
Perhaps we are to construct the index for a society by asking what would 
be rationally prudent for a person who knew that he would start out in the 
worst-off group in that society, who knew what the society was like, but who 
did not know particular facts about himself. Before that says much about 
how to construct the index, though, it must be joined with an account of 
how it is rational to choose with limited information. For what is rational 
under limited information has notoriously been a matter of controversy in 
discussions of Rawls' theory. The difference principle has no clear content 
until directions are given for constructing the index of primary social goods in 
terms of which the principle is stated. 
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2. THE INDEXING PROBLEM FOR INCOME 
In all but the last section of this paper, I shall discuss the indexing problem 
for only one primary good, income. Income closely fits Rawls' description of 
a primary good as something a rational person wants whatever else he wants. 
For an income is not an allotment of particular commodities, but rather an 
opportunity to choose among the most diverse combinations of goods. An 
income, then, can be used in the pursuit of a wide range of alternative sets of  
goals. 
Restricting the initial discussion to income has a number of advantages. 
If conceptual problems arise with income, they will presumably remain when 
other primary social goods are included in the problem. We can perhaps 
best identify those problems by making simplifying assumptions. On the 
other hand, solutions to conceptual problems that arise in the case of income 
may turn out to apply to the general case of disparate primary social goods. 
We may, if we wish, think of the special case of  income as follows: we are 
now restricting ourselves to cases in which all primary goods other than 
income are distributed equally in a fixed amount, and then asking what 
would constitute maximizing the prospective incomes of those in the worst 
starting positions. For the sake of even more simplicity, I shall consider at 
the outset only cases of certainty, and suppose that we want to maximize 
the income of the worst-off person. 4 
Why might there be an indexing problem for incomes? An income, as I 
have said, amounts to a choice among diverse combinations of goods. Now 
although such a wide range of choices might be offered in other ways, the 
term 'income' suggests a particular way in which such a choice can be 
offered: one is faced with a quantity of income and a system of prices, and 
one may choose any combination of consumption goods the total price of 
which does not exceed one's income. For the sake of simplicity, I shall 
consider only such pure income-price systems at this point. 
The indexing problem for incomes is this. Alternative economic policies 
may produce different relative prices. It may be that given one economic 
policy, the worst-off person would face one income-price combination, and 
given another policy, the worst-off person would face another income-price 
combination. More than one person may be worst-off, and those people may 
not agree on which income-price combination is preferable. In that case, how 
is it to be settled which policy leaves the worst-off people best off? 


















The situation can be represented graphically. Suppose there are only two 
commodities, A and B. Any point in a two.dimensional graph then represents 
some combination of goods A and B, or commodity bundle. The purchasing 
power of  an income in the face of  certain prices can be represented by a 
budget constraint, such as x in Figure 1 : given that income and those prices, 
the person can purchase any commodity bundle on his budget constraint. 
He can also purchase less of  any commodity. The set of commodity bundles 
he can purchase is his budget set. 
I shall assume that each commodity is a good, in the sense that other 
things equal, each person prefers more of it to less. It follows from this 
assumption that a person's most preferred bundles lie on his budget 
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constraint. It also follows that given fixed prices, everyone agrees in pre- 
ferring greater income to less. 
Disagreement begins when alternative price ratios are considered. In 
Figure 1, the preferences of two people, 1 and 2, are represented by indif- 
ference curves in the space of commodity bundles, x is a budget constraint 
for someone who faces a high price for good A and a low price for good B; 
y is a budget constraint for someone who faces a low price for A and a high 
price for B. Person 1 prefers x to y and person 2 prefers y to x. An example 
of the indexing problem for incomes, then, is this: if one economic policy 
would face the worst-off members of society with constraint x and another 
would face them with constraint y,  which is the more just by the standards 
of the difference principle? Which policy, that is to ask, leaves the worst-off 
members of society better off? 
Is this really a problem of justice? Questions of justice, on Rawls' view, 
concern the basic structure of society, and the details of relative prices 
do not seem part of the basic structure. Justice in prices will be procedural: 
once the basic structure is just, the prices which emerge from the procedures 
it sanctions are just simply because they emerge from those procedures 
(cf. pp. 86-9,304-9).  
With all this granted, however, the indexing problem remains one of 
justice. Whether the basic structure itself is just will depend in part on the 
incomes that could be expected to emerge from it, and different arrange- 
ments of the basic structure can be expected to produce different price 
ratios. Among the basic economic decisions to be made are the degree to 
which prices should be administered rather than set by markets, whether 
necessities such as food and shelter should be subsidized, whether rec- 
reational and cultural activities should be subsidized, and so forth. All these 
decisions involve making some commodities cheaper than would the market, 
and any taxes used to finance subsidies will make some commodities more 
expensive than would the untaxed market. Decisions about the basic econ- 
omic structure of society affect price ratios as well as incomes, and we need 
some way of judging the alternatives by their expectable upshots, s 
3. A MINIMAL DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
I want to propose not a way of constructing an index of budget sets, but a 
weak version of the difference principle that does without an index. The 
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proposal in this section is weak and preliminary, and later I shall consider 
how to strengthen it so as to rule out as unjust some economic states which 
this weak preliminary version admits as just. Even in this preliminary version, 
though, the difference principle has enough strength to be in conflict with the 
norms of  efficiency: it may be that no Pareto efficient economic state is just 
by the difference principle, even in this weak formulation. 
I begin with some definitions and notation. Since the range of  choice an 
income represents is determined by prices, we must represent an individual's 
situation by giving not simply his nominal income, but the prices he faces. An 
individual state, then, will consist of  an income and a price vector. The 
income is a non-negative number, and the price vector is an assignment of  a 
non-negative number to each commodi ty  in a finite non-empty set c~. A social 
state consists of  a distribution and a price vector, where a distribution is an 
assignment of  an income to each person, or member of  a finite non-empty 
set I. Feasible social states 6 will be represented by italic, bold-face letters 
w, x,  y ,  z. Individual states will be represented by italic letters w, x, y,  z, with 
or without subscripts. People will be represented by i, j, and k, and where w 
is a social state, wi will be the individual state of  person i in w: the individual 
state, that is, consisting of  the income of  i in w and the price vector of  w. 
Since where prices differ, incomes may not be comparable in any obvious 
way, we might do well to start with comparisons only of  individual states 
with the same price vectors. Such individual states will be called directly com- 
parable. Let x > y iff x and y have the same price vector and the income o f x  
is greater than that of  y ;  in that case, we shall call x directly better than y.  
The relation >-, then, will be a strict partial ordering of individual states: 
transitive and irreflexive. 
Although > gives few comparisons, we can use it to construct a very weak 
comparison of  social states by a version of  the difference principle. According 
to the difference principle, a social state x is more just than social state y 
iff the worst-off person in x is better off than the worst-off person in y ,  and a 
social state x is just iff there is no feasible social state that is more just than x. 
To say that x is more just t hany ,  in other words, is to say that there is some- 
one such that everyone is better off  in x than he is in y.  Say, then, that social 
state x is directly more just  than social state y ,  or x , 7 *  y ,  iff x and y have the 
same price vector and x has a higher minimum income than y;  in other words, 
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x ~ "  * y iff (3])(Vi)xi ~ yj . 
A permissive version of the difference principle is that a social state x is just 
iff there is no feasible social state which is directly more just than x; we say, 
then, that x is minimally lust iff "~ (3z)zor x. A social state is minimally 
just, in other words, iff there is no feasible social state with the same prices 
and a higher minimum income. 
Now even the very restricted standard of comparison expressed by, f *  is 
incompatible with the weak Pareto principle: that if everyone prefers social 
state x to social state y,  then x is better than y.  The standard is incompatible 
with the Pareto principle not only in the sense that we may have x unani- 
mously preferred to y without having x directly more just than y. It is incom- 
patible in that if we try to combine the comparisons made by J *  with com- 
parisons made by the Pareto principle, we may have cycles. 
Where each person i has an ordering Pi of individual states, we might set 
the following two conditions on a relation ,7,, to be read 'is better than' or 
'is more just than'. 
Unanimity: For any x and y ,  if (Vi) xiPiyi, then x J y .  
Minimal Difference Principle: For any x and y ,  if x J *  y ,  then x ~ , Y y .  
We can find patterns of preference such that Unanimity and the Minimal 
Difference Principle cause J to cycle, and we can do so in the case of two 
goods and two people. A case is given in Figure 2; the idea behind it is this. 
Let person 1 prefer good A and person 2 prefer good B. Start 1 and 2 out in 
state z with equal incomes. Produce a Pareto improvement as follows. Raise 
the price of B and lower that of  A in such a way as to please 1 and displease 
2. Drop l 's income, but only slightly, so that 1 is still better off in the new 
state than he was in z. Raise 2's income enough to overcompensate him for 
the price change. Call the new state y;  then y is unanimously preferred to z. 
Now, leaving prices unchanged, form state x by returning 1 and 2 to their 
original incomes. That raises l ' s  income and lower 2's, producing, by the 
Minimal Difference Principle, a more just state. Thus x is more just than y 
by the Minimal Difference Principle, and y is unanimously preferred to z. 
Yet x differs from z only in that prices are changed to l ' s  advantage and 2's 
disadvantage. If a combination of Unanimity and the Minimal Difference 
Principle shows x to be better than z, then it is clear from the symmetry of 
the case that an analogous reverse argument will show that z is better than x. 











In Figure 2, y is unanimously preferred to z, x is more just thany  by the 
Minimal Difference Principle, w is unanimously preferred to x, and z is more 
just than w by the Minimal Difference Principle. The difference principle, 
even in its most weak and unproblematic form, cannot be reconciled with the 
weak Pareto principle. 
The point might be put another way. In the case we have been considering, 
if w, x, y ,  and z are the only feasible social states, then only w and y are 
Pareto optimal, but according to the Minimal Difference Principle, at most x 
and z are just. Now any principle that might reasonably be called a version of 
the difference principle will at least say what the Minimal Difference Principle 
says: that prices equal, the economic system with the higher minimal income 
is more just. For the very idea of the difference principle is to use overt 
criteria such as income for making interpersonal comparisons, and to judge 
economic systems by how well off, by those overt criteria, they make the 
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worst-off members of society. What we have shown, then, is that any faithful 
explication of the difference principle will yield a criterion of economic 
justice which is incompatible with the Pareto principle. 
4. S T R E N G T H E N I N G  THE PRINCIPLE:  SOME PITFALLS 
I turn now to strengthening the difference principle so as to rule out more 
economic systems as unjust. At this point, I shall make no attempt to recon- 
cile the difference principle with the Pareto principle, for we have seen the 
two to be irreconcilable. Later, I shall discuss whether the conflict between 
the two principles is a bad thing, and how the difference principle could be 
modified to avoid the conflict if we wanted to do so. 
Note first a pitfall. Since people differ in their preferences among indi- 
vidual states, we might want to compare not simply individual states, but 
people in individual states. Let a pair ( i ,x)  consisting of a person i and an 
individual state x be called a personal state. Perhaps instead of ranking indi- 
vidual states, which in effect are simply budget sets, we should rank personal 
states. That will allow us to take into account the preferences of the people 
involved. 
Now it is central to the difference principle that within a single social 
state, interpersonal comparisons are to be by income. For any individual 
state x, let l(x) be the income in that state. Let (i,x)B(],y) mean 'person i 
is better off in individual state x than is person ] in individual state y ' .  Then 
we must require the following. 
Interpersonal Comparison by Income (CI): For any social state x and 
people i and ], if I(xl) >I(xj), then (i, xi)B(], xj). 
An apparent advantage of considering personal states rather than mere 
budget constraints is that we can now make intrapersonal comparisons by 
consulting the preferences of  the person involved. 
Intrapersonal Comparisons by Preference (CP): For any person i and indi- 
vidual states x and y, if xPrv, then (i,x)B(i,y). 
Conditions CI and CP, though, will sometimes force the relation B to be 
cyclic. In Figure 3, we have 
(1) (1,x~)B(2,X2) by CI; 
(1,yl)B(1,xl) by CP; 
X~ 
• 










(2) (2 ,y2)B(1 ,y~)  by CI; 
(2 , x2 )B(2 , y : )  by CP. 
Thus B is cyclic. 
We have not shown that where B is cyclic, a J d e f i n e d  from B must be 
cyclic. Nevertheless, the ease with which the relation of being better off can 
be made to cycle is grounds for caution. How should we proceed? One 
approach to making limited judgments of equity without pschologically 
based interpersonal comparisons is through a concept of 'envy ' .  The concept 
as originally formulated applied to bundles of goods: person i envies f 's 
bundle of  goods if he would rather have it than his own. The same consider- 
ations could be applied to personal states; We could say that person i in 
state xl envies person / in state y: if he preferes Yi to xi - if, in other 
words,  yyPixi. Now there can easily be cases wherey2Plx l  and x i P z y z ,  as in 
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2~ 
z x y  
xyz 
3~ 
y z x  Z ~ y "  X ~ 
i. 
• 
x y z x y  z 
- x y z  
y z x  
Fig. 4. 
Figure 1 with xl  = x  and Y2 =Y.  Perhaps the relation we should use is this: 
We say that i is definitely better o f f  in xi than is / i ny j  if both i and j prefer 
x i to Yi. I shall write this x . f i y  j. 
That suggests the following version of  the difference principle. We do not 
hope for a complete weak ordering of personal states, but only for a partial 
ordering. B will be the relation is definitely better o f f  than, and it holds 
between personal states. We have (i, x~B(j ,y)  iff x P y  and xPy.  We define 
the relation x is more /ust than y,  or x~,P'y, as follows: 
(4) x ~ T y  iff (3j)(Vi)(i, x i )B(j ,y j ) .  
Social state x is just iff no feasible social state is more just than x. 
Now this new J too is cyclic. To see this, note first that even when 
preferences are well-behaved in the usual ways, there will be triples of  
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income-price situations such that any preference ordering o f  them is possible. 
Moreover, where x and y are individual states, it will be possible to find an 
individual state x* that is directly comparable to x such that x*PiY. That is, 
it is always possible to raise someone's income enough to compensate him for 
an unfavorable shift in prices. Hence we may suppose we have the following 
orderings of  individual states: l : xyz ;  2: zxy; 3: yzx,  where everyone prefers 
each of  x*, y* ,  z* to each of  x, y ,  z, and moreover, x* is directly comparable 
to x, y* to y,  and z* to z. The situation is as shown in Figure 4. Let the social 
states be 
x = (x,x,x*>, 
y = <y,y*,y>, 
z : (z*,z,z>. 
Then x~S~y, because xP1y, xPI2Y, and x'Play. Like arguments show that 
y~Tz and z J x ,  yielding a cycle. 
5. A WAY OUT 
The idea of  this proof  was to exploit an appropriate cyclic majority among 
three individual states. 1 prefers x to y,  and so he prefers everyone's state in 
x to his in y.  2 also prefers x to y ,  and so prefers his state in x to l ' s  in y .  
Even though 3 prefers y to x,  he is made rich enough in x to prefer his state 
in x to l 's  in y.  In that sense, x makes everyone better off than someone is 
made in y.  
Since this relation is cyclic, we need to strengthen the difference principle 
as applied to ~,F so as to make fewer comparisons. Note that in the above 
example, although 1 and 2 agree that 2 is better off in x than 1 is in y ,  3 does 
not: 3 prefersy to x. Perhaps, then, we should consider i better off  in x than/'  
is in y only if everyone prefers individual state xi to individual state yj. Our 
standard now makes no mention of  the individuals involved, and so we can 
consider it a method for comparing individual states rather than personal 
states. We can now say xBy iff (Vi)xPff; in that case, we say that one is 
unequivocally better of f  in individual state x than in individual state y.  x is 
more/just than y ,  or x J y ,  iff there is some individual j such that one is 
unequivocally better off  in anyone's state in x than one is in/j's state in y .  
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Formally put, we have x~Z'y iff (3])(Vi)xiBy J. The Difference Principle will 
say that x is just iff there is no feasible state z such that z~P'x. 
jC' is  a strict partial ordering; that is, transitive and irreflexive. The simple 
lemma behind this claim will be useful in later discussion, and bears explicit 
statement. Note at the outset that B as defined here is a strict partial order- 
ing, since it is simply a relation of unanimous preference among individual 
states. 
LEMMA: Let B be any strict partial ordering of individual states, and define 
x J y  as (3])(Vi)xiByj. Then J is a strict partial ordering of social states. 
Proof:~F is irreflexive, because x~?'x means (3])(Vi)xtBxj, which entails 
that for some/ ,  xjBxj, contradicting the irreflexivity of B. To see that , , ,  r is 
transitive, suppose x ~ y  and y J z .  Then there are a ] such that (Vi)xiBy j 
and a k such that (Vi)yiBz k. Therefore, yjBzk, and since (Vi)x~Byj, by 
transitivity of B, we have (Vi)xiBzk. Therefore xo~Z'z. 
Since f is a strict partial ordering, there will always be at least one feas- 
ible social state which is just according to the Difference Principle. We have 
seen that in some cases, no feasible social state which is just according to the 
Difference Principle will be Pareto optimal, for the Minimal Difference 
Principle allowed all states as just that the Difference Principle does, as a 
check of the criteria will show, but it was Pareto-incompatible. 
What the Difference Principle in its present form says is this. A social state 
x is just unless for some feasible social state z, everyone agrees that he would 
rather face the prices in z with the income of the poorest person in z than 
face the prices of x with the income of the poorest person in x. We have, 
then, a consistent version of the Difference Principle as restricted to income. 
That version is, I Suspect, as strong as it can be made without introducing 
either an element of  arbitrariness, or interpersonal comparisons of happiness, 
strength of preference, or the like. 
6. PARETO C OM P ATIBILITY 
How should we regard the Pareto-incompatibility of the Difference Principle? 
Does the joint inconsistency of the Difference Principle and the Pareto 
Principle disquality the Difference Principle as a principle of justice? I think 
not. Remember that in Rawls' theory, a principle of justice is to serve as part 
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of a public conception of justice, to which people appeal in adjudicating con- 
flicts over the basic structure of society. A principle of justice is not designed 
for an impartial, well-informed god with the power to institute whatever 
economic system he decides is most just. Rather, the application of a 
principle of justice should be understood by the people affected: whatever 
the principle in fact endorses as just ought to be seen as what the principle 
endorses by the people whose interests are involved. It is partly for that 
reason that the Difference Principle is put in terms of primary social goods 
rather than utilities. 
Now conflicts between the Difference Principle and the Pareto Principle 
arise in cases like that of Figure 2. Suppose that in Figure 2, only social 
states w, x, y ,  and z are feasible. Then only w and y are Pareto efficient. 
Consider y:  y contains unequal incomes, and is unjust according to the 
Difference Principle because a feasible alternative, x, has the same prices and 
equal incomes at an intermediate level, x, by a criterion that involves only 
incomes, is more just than y.  Neither x nor y is a Pareto improvement over 
the other, but judged by income, x is the more egalitarian. The same could be 
said of  w and z. 
Should social state z, in which all incomes are equal, be rejected as unjust 
because it is Pareto inefficient? Questions of justice aside, everyone prefers 
y, with unequal incomes, to z with equal incomes: one group because y shifts 
price in a way favorable to them, and the other because they are over- 
compensated for an unfavorable price shift. All realize, though, that once 
they have shifted to y,  there will be a conflict of interest over whether to 
shift further to x. They have agreed to resolve such conflicts by looking at 
income, and maximizing the minimal income level. By that principle, they 
will be committed to the further shift to x. Once people have agreed to make 
interpersonal comparisons by an overt standard of income, they should 
realize that to accept unequal incomes for the sake of a state everyone prefers 
to egalitarian state z may be to raise new questions of justice which, by agree- 
ment, will be resolved by moving to a state that differs from z only by a price 
sh i f t -  a price shift favorable to some and unfavorable to others. Realizing 
that, they may find it reasonable to forego a Pareto improvement for the sake 
of retaining an overt standard for the resolution of conflicts over the basic 
structure of  society. 
If all this leaves the reader unconvinced, he may wish to adopt a Paretian 
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version of  the Difference Principle: that a social state is just iff either it is just 
according to the old, non-Paretian difference principle, or it is a weak Pareto 
improvement over some state which is just according to the non-Paretian dif- 
ference principle. Liberalized slightly more, the principle might read as 
follows. 
Paretian Difference Principle: A social state x is just iff for some feasible 
social state y ,  
~, (3i)yiPixi, 
~ (~z ,  i ) ( v i ,  k)z~ekyj. 
This says that a social state is just iff there is a state which is just by the non- 
Paretian difference principle which no one likes any better. 
7. E C O N O M I C A L L Y  I N F L U E N C E D  P R E F E R E N C E S  
So far, in formulating the difference principle, I have taken preferences as 
fixed independently of  the choice of economic systems. Given the pref- 
erences PI . . . .  ,Pn of all n members of  society, I have proposed that xBy, 
individual state x is definitely better than individual state y ,  iff (Vi)xPy. For 
two social states x and y ,  I have proposed that x J y  iff for some person, 
everyone is definitely better off  in x than he is in y .  What the difference 
principle now says of  basic economic structures is this: in conditions of  
certainty, one basic economic structure is definitely more just than another 
iff, where the first would lead to social state x and the second would lead to 
social state y ,  we have x J y .  A basic economic structure is just iff no alterna- 
tive basic economic structure is definitely more just than it. 
This principle needs to be modified. For preferences among bundles of  
commodities are clearly not fixed independently of  the economic system: 
alternative basic economic structures will lead to different preferences. 7 
Perhaps, then, we should do the following. Let ~r be the set of  all preference 
orderings P over bundles of  commodities such that for some basic economic 
structure, if that structure were instituted someone might have preference 
ordering P. Then for individual states x and y ,  say xBy iff ( g P G g ) x P y .  
Alternatively, if we want a more discriminating criterion, let us s a y  that 
xBy iff (3PE,C~)xPy and ~ ( a P ~ ) y P x .  The new B is a strict partial 
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ordering, and so by the l.emma of Section 6, where x~,Fy means 
(3j)(Vi)xiByj, ,,,Fis a partial ordering. 
The Difference Principle as now formulated says the following. A basic 
economic structure is just iff no alternative basic structure is definitely more 
just. In order to see whether a basic economic structure X is definitely more 
just than another, Y, do the following: For each basic structure, consider the 
incomes and prices to which it would lead; let these be given by social states 
x and y respectively. Consider the situation Xmi n of a worst-off person in x; 
Xmi n consists of facing the prices of  x with the least income of anyone in x. 
Compare that with Ymin, the situation of the worst-off person in y. Xmi n is 
definitely superior to Ymin iff anyone, no matter what basic economic struc- 
ture had influenced his preferences, would prefer facing situation Xmin to 
facing Ymin. x is definitely more just than y iff Xmi n is definitely superior 
tOYmin. 
This criterion is permissive, in that it allows policies that shift prices so 
long as anyone prefers the consequent situation of the worst -off-where  
'anyone' here includes any sort of person who might emerge from a basic 
economic structure open for choice at the legislative stage. Suppose, for 
instance, in an impoverished society, we consider whether to tax everyone 
to heap lavish subsidies on grand opera. Let X be a basic economic structure, 
and Y that structure modified by the opera subsidy scheme. Under Y, the 
poorest people have a slightly lower income than the poorest people have 
under X, but under Y they have a chance to purchase tickets to grand spec- 
tacles that would consume more than their entire income under X. The 
tickets are expensive, let us suppose, but the poorest person could purchase 
one if he sacrificed enough in the way of other commodities. In that case, it 
may be that none of the poorest people do purchase opera tickets, and so by 
the test of their own preferences, they are worse off with the subsidy scheme 
than without. It may also be that none of the richer people who do buy 
tickets would do so if they were as poor as the worst off. None of these facts 
will settle the issue of whether X is definitely more just than Y, although 
they establish that Y is not definitely more just than X. The test is rather 
this: Would any basic economic structure open for choice at the legislative 
stage produce anyone so devoted to opera that, faced with a choice of being 
poorest under X and being poorest under Y, he would choose Y, preferring 
the combination of seeing opera at the cost of an expensive ticket and 
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additional taxes to the alternative of being unable to see it at all. If  so, then X 
is not definitely more just than Y. If moreover, no other basic economic 
structure open for choice at the legislative stage is definitely more just than 
either X or Y, then according to the Difference Principle, both X and Y are 
just. It would then be both just to have the opera subsidy and just not to 
have it. 
Is this criterion overly permissive in the subsidies it allows for the pursuits 
of the r i ch -  or, for that matter, in the subsidies it allows for the objects of 
unusual tastes? Perhaps so, but the limits of what it allows should be noted. 
Call a basic economic structure eligible iff it is open for choice at the legis- 
lative stage. Which structures are eligible is constrained by feasibility, the 
priority of liberty, and the priority of having all positions of privilege open to 
all. Now the set ~r consists of those preference orderings that would be 
formed under any basic economic structure that is eligible. The restriction to 
eligible structures is crucial. Eligible structures satisfy a constraint of liberty, 
and so cannot include such things as a compulsory course of brainwashing to 
determine preferences. The preferences in P, then, do not consist of all pref- 
erences that might be produced by a suitable course of conditioning, but 
simply those preference orderings that would arise under circumstances of 
liberty given various basic economic structures compatible with liberty. Thus 
a scheme of opera subsidies may be unjust, since it may be that no one who 
forms his tastes freely will be so exclusively devoted to opera that even were 
he among the poorest of the poor, he would willingly sacrifice the price of a 
ticket and his share of the subsidy in order to see a lavish opera. 
8. OTHER PRIMARY SOCIAL GOODS 
AND UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS 
Return now to the problem of primary social goods in general. Just as an 
income constitutes a choice among alternative bundles of  commodities, so 
does a combination of primary social goods - income and wealth, powers and 
opportunities - constitute a choice ~mong alternative bundles; now, though, 
a bundle consists both of commodities and of exercises of powers and oppor- 
tunities. Call a set of such bundles an opportunity set. A rational person 
certain of his preferences will prefer one opportunity set x to another y iff 
he prefers the most preferred bundle in x to all bundles in y. We may now 
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treat opportunity sets just as we have been treating individual situations, and 
formulate a version of the difference principle that applies to primary 
economic goods in general. 
First, though, consider another problem. So far, I have talked as if the 
choice of a basic economic structure determines, for each person, precisely 
how he will fare. As Rawls emphasizes, though, such matters are not certain, 
and the difference principle as Rawls states it evaluates an economic system 
by the prospects it offers those in the worst starting position (see pp. 78, 96). 
What is really needed, then, is not an index of incomes or opportunity sets, 
but an index of prospects over opportunity sets - or, as I have been suggest- 
ing, a substitute for an index in the form of a partial ordering. 
Even for prospects over income with fixed prices, a ranking by expected 
money value will not do. For suppose we judge prospects by their expected 
money payoff. Consider two economic systems: under system X, everyone in 
a worst-off starting position will get $ 9000 per year, whereas under system 
Y, half will get $ 20,000 and half will starve with no income at all. For those 
in the worst-off starting positions, then, the expected money value of system 
Y is higher than that of X. Surely, though, anyone would prefer starting out 
worst off in system X to starting out worst off in system Y. It would be 
preposterous to prefer system Y to system X out of a regard for the plight of 
those in the worst starting positions. 
Now the formal method we have been using will apply to a choice among 
prospects over opportunity sets, and do so without measuring the prospects 
of those in the worst starting positions by anything like their expected 
money value. Let ~9 ~ be the set of all eligible basic economic structures - all 
basic economic structures open for selection at the legislative stage. Le t~"  
be the set of  all prospects over opportunity sets that would be offered anyone 
under any structure in d ~, and let variables 2, p, 2 take prospects in ~ as 
values. Let g be the set of all those preference orderings of members of 
that any one would have some likelihood of developing under any structure 
in S Then we can define what it is for one prospect to be definitely better 
than another: 
~Bp iff (3PEg)Ycl~&~(3P~g)pefc .  
Let the social prospect offered by a structure S ~  .Y be the n-tuple 
-~ = (~1 . . . . .  5r of prospects offered by S to the members of the society. 
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Then where S, T ~ 27, we say that S is definitely more just than T iff, where 
2 is the social prospect offered by S and.~, is the social prospect offered by T, 
(3])(Vi)kiBpj. 
Then basic economic structure S is just iff no alternative structure T E  Y is 
definitely more just than S. What this says is that a structure is just so long 
as there is no eligible structure T which improves the prospect of the worst- 
off in the following sense: that some prospect 2 offered by S is so unappeal- 
ing compared to all the prospects offered by T that anyone, no matter how 
his preferences had developed in circumstances of liberty, would prefer each 
of the prospects offered by T to prospect 2. 8 
I do not know how Rawls would find this as an explication of the differ- 
ence principle. Clearly it conflicts with the letter of what he says: it evades 
the construction of an index rather than constructing it, and yields a principle 
in conflict with the norms of efficiency. It differs from Rawls in its treatment 
of relevant social positions (pp. 95-100), and avoids aggregation of expec- 
tations where Rawls permits it. It may be more permissive than Rawls would 
like, in that a system is saved from being condemned as less just than an 
alternative so long as for each prospect it offers, there might be one person 
whose preferences developed under conditions of liberty and who prefers 
that prospect to some prospect offered by the alternative. 
On the other hand, the principle I have proposed captures a number of 
aspects of Pawls' theory. It takes seriously the dictum that primary goods 
are things it is rational to want whatever else one wants, by explaining them 
as opportunities to Choose among bundles of more specific goods. It avoids 
interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction, and instead looks at prospects for 
overtly observable income, powers, and opportunities. It avoids the sup- 
position that preferences are fixed independently of the economic structure, 
and while it respects the constrai~ats of human nature on preferences formed 
in conditions of liberty, it makes comparisons of prospects independently of 
the kinds of preferences that would be formed in any particular economic 
system. Finally, it captures the idea of making the worst off as well off as poss- 
ible. In a just society, on the explication in this paper, even a person in the 
worst Starting position should realize that, in a sense, it would be impossible 
to make everyone better off than he in fact is. "In every alternative basic 
economic structure", he may be told with truth, "there is a starting position 
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tha t  is no be t t e r  than yours ,  in the sense that  someone  wi th  p re fe rences  
fo rmed  under  l iber ty might  like that  s tart ing pos i t ion  no more  than  the  start- 
ing pos i t ion  y o u  actual ly have" .  9 
University of Michigan 
N O T E S  
i Page references, unless otherwise indicated, are to Rawls (1971). 
2 Plott (1978) discusses the problem of indexing primary social goods. His approach 
differs from mine in a number of respects that are discussed in Note 8. 
3 Rawls speaks at one point (p. 97) as if when greater powers and income go together 
in a society, the indexing problem is avoided. Earlier, he argues only that in that case, 
the problem is simplified (p. 94). 
4 Rawls speaks not of making the worst off person as well off as possible, but of making 
the worst-off 'representative man' as well off as possible. He ponders the question of 
what group's expectations should be aggregated in order to define the worst-off rep- 
resentative man. We are to consider the 'starting places' in society 'properly generalized 
and aggregated' (p. 96). In this paper I try to avoid aggregation, but in Section 8 I try to 
do at least part of what Rawls wants to accomplish by aggregation, by taking up his 
point that we are to apply the maximin criterion to starting positions and the expec- 
tations that attach to them, rather than to achieved income levels. 
s Rawls writes that the difference principle holds among other things "for income and 
property taxation, for fiscal and economic policy" (1975, p. 97. See also 1977, p. 164.). 
6 Whether a social state is feasible will depend on individuals' preferences, since in a 
feasible social state, the demand for each commodity must equal its supply. (I owe this 
observation to Roy Gardner.) Here preferences are taken as fixed; the case of malleable 
preferences is taken up in Sections 7 and 8. 
7 This problem was brought to my attention by John Bennett. The point is important 
in Rawls' thought; see 1974, p. 641 and 1975, p. 95. 
8 The approach I have taken to the indexing problem differs from Plott's in a number of 
respects. Plott considers the problem of indexing bundles of disparate goods, whereas I 
consider the problem of indexing sets of such bundles, or prospects over sets of such 
bundles. Plott makes assumptions from which it follows that social states can be weakly 
ordered by the level of welfare of their worst-off people; I require only a partial order- 
ing. Finally, Plott interprets the difference principle as a requirement that social insti- 
tutions be designed so as to achieve a most just state whatever well-behaved preferences 
people may have. I am simply inquiring whether the difference principle can be intel- 
ligibly formulated in a way that guarantees that at/east one feasible state will be just. 
Plott shows that the rest of the conditions he imposes are incompatible with Pareto 
principle, and so in that respect, his conclusion is similar to the conclusion that the weak 
difference principle is incompatible with the Pareto principle. 
9 I' am grateful to John Bennett for extensive and extremely helpful discussion of this 
paper. 
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